with good practice in industrial relations and reflects mutual trust's origins in the duty of co-operation by requiring the employer to take positive steps without which the employee is unable to enjoy a right 12 [1973] 40 DLR (3d) 371. 13 D. Brodie, `The Employment Relationship and Fiduciary Obligations' (2012) 16 ELR 198, 203. 14 Freedland, above n.1, 190. 15 Yapp v FCO [2013] ICR D21 demonstrates the extent to which mutual trust and confidence has resulted in notions of natural justice being embedded in the employment contract: ` a golden thread through the case law on fair treatment is that those liable to be affected by a decision must be given prior notice of it so that they can make representations. A corollary is that any representations must be taken into account by the decision-maker. The greater detriment a decision is likely to cause the more demanding these duties.' 16 Commonwealth Bank above n.1. or benefit conferred upon him by the contract. It is of note that the benefit under the contract was not a specific entitlement (as in Scally) but was conceived in terms of the totality of the employment relationship.
At first sight, the way in which the law of the employment contract has become increasingly informed by notions of good faith would not encourage the development of a hypothesis that a world of shared values is in prospect. However, of late, obligations of fair dealing have become more evident in other areas of the law of contract. It is my contention that this will result in the content of all contracts for the provision of work displaying a greater measure of good faith. A number of factors can be seen as responsible for this development but three in particular merit detailed discussion: the implications of a relationship being analogous to one of employment; the consequences of a contract being categorised as relational; and the validity of conventional assumptions about the role of good faith in the general principles of the law of contract.
Analogous Relationships
In some jurisdictions the courts have now acknowledged that the characteristics highlighted in Wallace can also be found in some types of contract which conventionally would be styled commercial; they are undoubtedly important characteristics where the employment contract is concerned but cannot be seen as unique. A highly significant example is the contract of franchise given that franchisees resemble `functionaries for large capitalist corporations.' 17 In Shelanu Inc v Print Three Franchising Corp it was observed that the contract is one of ` adhesion… Further, insofar as access to information is concerned, the franchisee is dependent on the franchisor for information about the franchise, its location and projected cash flow, and is typically required to take a training program devised by the franchisor. The third characteristic, namely that the relationship continues to be affected by the power imbalance, is also met by the fact the franchisee is required to submit to inspections of its premises and audits of its books on demand, to comply with operation bulletins, and, often is dependent on, or required to buy, equipment or product from the franchisor.' 18 Those shared characteristics mean that the franchisee is vulnerable in very similar ways to the employee. As with employment there is much scope for unfair exercise of prerogative power on the part of the franchisor. The impact of an unfair or harsh termination will be felt very strongly in both cases. In Wallace it was said that the `point at which the employment relationship ruptures is the time when the employee is most vulnerable and hence, most in need of protection. In recognition of this need, the law ought to encourage conduct that minimizes the damage and dislocation (both economic and personal) that result from dismissal'
19
; these concerns would seem equally applicable to the franchisee. It should also be said that the franchisee may experience additional vulnerabilities compared to the employee; some face a double jeopardy in that they are both franchisees and tenants. Again, the fact that the franchisee will often be required to put up a significant amount of capital leaves them heavily exposed to the risk of opportunistic behaviour:
`The incentive that causes a business with sunk costs to stay in operation despite losses makes franchisees vulnerable to franchisor behaviour known as 'opportunism'. Because the franchisee will continue to operate even if it is not recovering its sunk investments, the franchisor can make decisions that induce such losses without the franchisee going out of business. When these decisions benefit the franchisor at the expense of the franchisee, the franchisor opportunistically extracts a portion of the franchisee's sunk costs. A franchisor can potentially extract this value from the franchise directly in a number of ways: it can raise the price of goods sold to franchisees, increase rent, boost royalties through an increase in the required volume of a franchise, levy fees or divert advertising funds to general corporate uses. Extractions can occur indirectly as well. To increase the price of new franchises, a franchisor could require franchisees to make excessive advertising investments, to participate in promotional programs which are not cost effective, or to undertake unnecessary renovations.'
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The recognition of the existence and significance of shared characteristics has meant that in a number of jurisdictions good faith is adopting a more prominent role in a wider range of contracts. The journey in the UK that was prompted by the emergence of mutual trust and confidence is being replicated.
Where a franchise is concerned the obligations imposed on the franchisor resemble those imposed on an employer by virtue of the latter obligation. The benefits of the protection afforded can be very considerable. The fact that the franchisor had used his powers for an improper purpose was found to be a breach of the implied term of fair dealing in Antony's Pier v HBC . 27 There it was held that withholding consent under an express clause (which provided for the approval by the land owner of the developer's plans) with a view to forcing financial concessions involved a breach of contract. A word of caution should be sounded; as in assessing the impact of mutual trust and confidence it is salutary to bear in mind that in some cases the outcome would have been the same had the decision been decided on a basis other than that of fair dealing. A decision that a breach of contract has arisen given the improper use of powers conferred might be arrived at by construction of the terms concerned: `If a contract confers power on a contracting party in terms wider than necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of that party, the courts may interpret the power as not extending to the action proposed by the party in whom the power is vested or, alternatively, conclude that the powers are being exercised in a capricious or arbitrary manner or for an extraneous purpose, which is another way of saying the same thing.'
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As with the employment contract the task of the adjudicator is eased by a willingness to generalise once one has identified a category of relationship that tends to contain a wide disparity of bargaining power. These requirements concern food type and standards, kitchen and service areas, the manner, presentation and sale of food, the design, appearance and standard of the premises including adjacent parking areas, hours of trading, staffing including training and presentation, and financial reporting.' 34 A franchise agreement often simply gives rise to an employment relationship by another name with the corollary that the franchisee will be as vulnerable as an employee. Abuse of superior bargaining power should be addressed irrespective of the way in which the working relationship is constituted by the employer. The Privy Council decision in Caltex v Feenan dealt with a solus agreement and illustrates this very well. 35 The claimants had agreed to supply petrol bought from Caltex at a service station leased from them. The contract involved would have been categorised as commercial but obliged the claimants to provide labour (formally the obligation was not to provide their own though the practical reality was different). The Privy Council found that operating through this medium meant that labour costs may be less than where employees are hired directly. In addition, the employer gained not only the licence fee and rental of goodwill but procured `an assured and profitable outlet for their products without incurring the expense of paying wages to employees for doing what, under the solus contract, the Feenans had bound themselves to do instead.' It is important that the law affords protection in situations of this type to ensure that those providing labour are not exploited. In Caltex the terms of the contract made it inevitable that the claimants would themselves have to perform the work required to discharge the obligations set out in the solus agreement: `The Feenans undertook to conduct the business on the premises during all lawful hours and to use their best endeavours to secure any necessary authority or permission to secure that those lawful hours should be as long as possible.' They lived, in effect, the lives of employees and like many employees found themselves working excessive hours for limited reward.
Relational Contracts
Shenelau, by looking to analogous relationships, can be seen as expounding a more general principle than that found in Wallace; its application though is restricted to agreements that exhibit particular 36 One of the key factors in favour of this outcome was the fact that the agreement was seen as relational and implication was seen as furthering the values of such contracts: ` The parties are not aiming at utility-maximisation directly through the performance of specified obligations; rather, they are aiming at utility-maximisation indirectly through long term cooperative behaviour manifested in trust and not in reliance on obligations specified in advance'. Contracts are of this ilk. It is difficult to gauge how influential the international and comparative position has been but the strong degree of consensus conveys a very cogent message. Against that backdrop, we find that fair dealing has come much more to the fore in commercial law in the UK.
Since Reda was decided the law of commercial contracts has become increasingly willing to incorporate obligations of this nature dealing. Cases such as the decision of the Court of Appeal in Socimer
International Bank v Standard Bank, which dealt with a commercial contract between two banks, hold that discretionary provisions are now regulated in a manner similar to the way that they would be if they arose in the employment contract: ` Where A and B contract with one another to confer a discretion on A, that does not render B subject to A's uninhibited whim. In my judgment, the authorities show that not only must the discretion be exercised honestly and in good faith, but, having regard to the provisions of the contract by which it must be conferred, it must not be exercised arbitrarily, of the work of good faith.' 52 However, the steadily increasing weight of case law may lead to the emergence of an overarching principle of good faith. Certainly, when we take into account the way in which the law of contract in similar common law systems has developed it does not seem fanciful to suggest that such a norm is likely to become part of the law of commercial contracts sooner rather than later. Australian experience indicates that once disputes begin to be adjudicated by reference to a norm of fair dealing it is not long before that norm becomes embedded. There has been a radical shift of position in Australia over the last 20 years and ` fundamental notions of caveat emptor' now seem utterly anachronistic. The decision in Rennard Constructions (ME) Pty Limited v Minister for Public Works has proved to be highly influential; there it was said that ` people generally, including judges and other lawyers, from all strands of the community, have grown used to the courts applying standards of fairness to contract which are wholly consistent with the existence in all contracts of a duty upon the parties of good faith and fair dealing in its performance. In my view this is in these days the expected standard, and anything less is contrary to prevailing community expectations.' 53 Since then there have been numerous decisions of the Australian courts that have regulated the dealings of commercial parties by reference to implicit obligations of fair dealing. 54 It would be erroneous to describe the law as settled (a decision of the High Court would be beneficial) but it does seem highly unlikely that the world of traditional contracting will be restored. The case law exhibits a degree of uncertainty over whether implication is contingent upon the presence of inequality of bargaining power. The most that can be said is that the existence of disparity makes it more likely that an obligation of fair dealing will be held to exist. There has also been a measure of controversy with respect to whether the obligation of fair dealing should be seen as in implied term in fact or law. This reflects the fact that commercial relationships are now seen as much more diffuse and it does not make sense to treat them as a singular class.
Fairer Contracting?
In Australia and Canada good faith has much to say about the way in which a contract for work should be conducted. Analysis of case law in the UK indicates a trend towards fair dealing playing a greater part in such disputes but, beyond the employment contract, the law is still in a decidedly embryonic agreement. In cases involving the enforceability of restrictive covenants the contract has been treated as analogous to the goodwill cases rather than ones dealing with the employment contract. 55 Similarly, attempts to suggest that a franchise agreement is subject to the obligation of mutual trust and confidence have foundered because the relationship was seen as commercial in nature.
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I would suggest that this is likely to change sooner rather than later where the relationship can be viewed as analogous to employment. The incremental approach to the extension of Wallace which took place in Shelanu is an attractive and convincing one. The problems faced by the weaker party are of a broadly similar nature and it is equitable that parity of protection is afforded. The characteristics which are shared generate common problems; common solutions will often be apposite. Such a development of the law would not be dependent on the recognition of an overarching principle of good faith. As with the emergence of mutual trust and confidence the approach in Shelanu is firmly grounded in the values of the common law which "… will not permit abuse of power. This is the basis of judicial review, and it reflects also the basis of all those private law doctrines where public policy has been held to restrain one man's hold over another"
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Some relationships might be thought to be closely analogous to employment; Freedland's concept of the semi-dependent worker comes to the fore at this juncture. 58 Mutual trust and confidence might readily attach to such a relationship given it `may actually be a personal one and a high-trust one to the same extent as the fully dependent work relationship. Indeed, some semi-dependent workers' contracts may embody more personal and even, in a sense, higher trust relationships that some contracts of liability can now arise with respect to a prisoner. 63 It is striking that JGE confirms that the employer is not liable for the activities of independent contractors; thereby denying the existence of perhaps the clearest analogy. This conclusion was reached even though the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the endeavours of the self-employed may be just as central to the success of the enterprise as those of employees: `the employer may have as close a connection with his regularly used independent contractor as he has with an employee who is but an anonymous member of his workforce.'
I would suggest though that the position adopted by the law of vicarious liability will not diminish the force of arguments by analogy where the law of the contract is concerned. Vicarious liability is an area where policy considerations dominate and JGE may simply reflect the long established orthodoxy that, for a variety of reasons, the employer is not vicariously liable for an independent contractor. The policy issues which are relevant to the formation of default rules for contracts for work are of a different order. It is also the case that the increasing emphasis on enterprise liability may lead to a reassessment of the traditional position in tort. The latter doctrine has led to an expansion of the types of behaviour that lead to liability; it is equally relevant to the identification of relationships that render the employer responsible. I would suggest that maintaining that relationships of self-employment are not caught by an `akin to employment' test is unstable and likely to be sustainable. 
The Contract for Services Revisited
Against this backdrop, where the law of contract is concerned, I would suggest that an individual entering into a contract for services is likely to be held to be in a position analogous to the employee.
Contracts where the services are provided by a corporate body lie at the other end of the spectrum and such a relationship would only fully take on board a norm of good faith when contract law as a whole adopts an overarching principle. There is a myriad of intermediate positions which render generalisation problematic. Where individuals are concerned I would anticipate that a default rule of fair dealing will emerge shortly. It is already the case that the content of contracts for the provision of work display a great deal of commonality and further convergence would be a perfectly natural development. As I have discussed, it had previously been thought that matters might be somewhat different where the personal elements of the contract for services were concerned and, in particular, that the implied term of mutual trust and confidence had no application. This outcome can be justified on the basis that the implication of the term assumes the existence of a contract involving personal relations. However, I would argue that the existence of disparity in bargaining power and the consequent risk of abuse of power are sufficient in themselves to justify a norm of fair dealing being required. The element of personal relations in the employment relationship should be seen as an additional reason for the importation of an obligation of mutual trust. Of course a number of mutual trust cases address appropriate standards of behaviour in the workplace and render conduct such as bullying and harassment a breach of contract. The focus is on the way in which personal relations are carried out on a day to day basis rather than the economic elements of the bargain. Where selfemployment is concerned cases of this type might also arise and there is no reason why they should not be dealt with in the same way. Someone running a small business may well be treated in a degrading or humiliating way by the larger concern with which he trades; either by a particular individual with whom a relationship has built up or more opaquely. In any event, personals relationships emerge in a variety of relational contracts; not just the employment contract. Macneil asserts that the 'whole person' is liable to be more important in an ongoing relationship: parties 'derive complex personal non-economic satisfactions and engage in social exchange, as well as … economic exchange'. 65 It may be said though that the element of personal relations is a universal characteristic of contracts for the personal provision of work; a claim which cannot be maintained in other contexts. This may well be true but we should not disregard this dimension when it does arise elsewhere.
65 Macneil, above n.40, 72.
Common law developments in the law of tort are also relevant in considering how the contract for services is likely to develop. I would suggest that they also point towards convergence. 66 Currently, the employer owes the self-employed worker less extensive obligations in terms of health and safety than are owed to the employee. The reason why a more restricted duty is owed may be that 'the risk of accident is incidental to the contractor's enterprise rather than his employer's'. However, such an allocation of risk is based upon a set of assumptions which come under challenge from current judicial notions of enterprise liability. 67 Enterprise liability seeks to attribute legal responsibility to the enterprise for activities which it has undertaken that carry risks. The pursuit of any particular activity may require the services not just of an entity's own employees but also those who contract on a different basis. It is submitted that it follows from this that the duty of care owed to, for example, a contractor's employees should be in line with that owed to the enterprise's actual employees. Both groups of staff encounter risks created by the enterprise whilst furthering its aims. It would seem equitable that parity of treatment in terms of safety obligations exist.
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Differences between the contract for employment and that for services will of course remain. The employee owes an obligation of fidelity but the contractor does not. However, an obligation of confidentiality might well be implied where the matter is not otherwise dealt with. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the overall trend is very much in favour of convergence. Scally brought about more demanding disclosure requirements within the employment relationship and there are some indications that commercial law is starting to follow suit. It appears that where a relational contract is concerned the courts have begun to impose requirements to disclose. In the Australian case of Macquarie
International it was said that a party may be obliged ` to disclose information to the other, listen to the other and negotiate in good faith about the working out of the contract in its living performance.'
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Similarly, in Yam Seng it was said to be arguable that the distributor was entitled to be informed of the manufacturer's best estimates of when the products would be available to sell and to be told of any material change in this information. The values said to underpinn relational contracts were crucial in both of these decisions as contracts of this type ` may require a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties' understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements.' 70 I would add that disparity in bargaining power is also an important consideration as asymmetry of information about the risks of the venture and so on is more likely to arise where the resources available to the parties are decidedly unequal.
The Contract of Employment Revisited
If obligations of good faith are becoming increasingly prevalent in the law of contract as a whole what are the implications for the employment contract? I believe that the `employment revolution' which we have witnessed over the past thirty years will gather renewed impetus and it is likely that the contract will develop further dimensions of the good faith type. The position on contracting-out may be progressed. On traditional principles, it would be possible to contract-out of the implied obligation of trust and confidence as the term is a default rule.
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The courts have been inclined to discourage any attempts at exclusion. 72 It is sometimes assumed that we can be confident that derogation would be forbidden by the judiciary on grounds of public policy given that mutual trust and confidence is absolutely fundamental to the employment relationship. A recent instance of such optimism can be found in the joint advice of the Law Commissions on Unfair Contract Terms. 73 The Commissions noted the argument that the decline of collective bargaining left more scope for substantively unfair terms in employment contracts. They also highlighted the concern over the potential use of express terms to contract out of the terms which Crucially, it aims to protect the employee's interest in not being `unfairly and improperly exploited '. 77 In my view, an attempt to set up an employment relationship without the term is a sham. The purported transformation of the relationship is just as radical and unacceptable as the attempt to convert employment to self-employment in Autoclenz or a lease into a licence in AG Securities.
The employer may seek to contract-out of particular applications of the term rather than attempt general exclusion. This will not avail him. In the recent Australian case of Barker the contract dealt expressly with a dimension of employment relations (redeployment) and declared that the matter was non-contractual. 78 The Federal Court accepted that, as a result, the employer was not bound on the basis of the published policy. Nevertheless, the employer was still found to be in breach of the implied term. The view was taken that any measures which the implied term would otherwise have required if the contract had been silent on the issue in question could not be denied in this way.
The fact that notions of good faith have become much more pervasive in contract law as a whole make it more likely that mutual trust and confidence will be rendered mandatory on grounds of public policy.
Good faith type obligations have become much harder to depict as exceptions to general principles or as features of particular types of contract. There is no longer a need for special pleading and there is growing acceptance that there is no other legitimate way to conduct business affairs.
Conclusions
The courts (in the UK and abroad) are increasingly willing to attribute to contracting parties an acceptance that commercial relations should be informed by fair dealing. Whether an overarching principle will emerge in the near future remains a matter of conjecture but the likelihood has increased markedly. Should that eventuality materialise the law on all forms of contracts for the provision of 77 Malik, above n. 9, 46. 78 Barker, above n. 1.
work will be affected by the consequent transformation in values underpinning commercial contracts.
For now it can be said with confidence that the laws of commercial and employment contracts are moving closer together. Moreover, there is good reason to think that, where relationships analogous to employment are concerned, good faith will undoubtedly play a significantly greater role. Numerous cases have arisen in other jurisdictions in the context of franchise relationships; partly because they frequently embody a significant disparity of bargaining power and call out for judicial activism. As with employment, terms are offered on a take it or leave it basis: `the same agreement is intended to be used throughout the network without variation.' 79 Inequality of bargaining power means that the weaker party is at risk of oppressive treatment in the way that, for example, discretionary provisions are exercised. The emergence of mutual trust and confidence was, at least in part, inspired by concerns which were seen as unique to the employment contract. Such assumptions are very much open to debate and it would often be appropriate to extend the common law protection afforded to employees to those who provide work under other types of contract.
